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ABSTRACT
The recent shift towards agricultural innovation systems recognises that
agricultural development is complex and must involve multiple actors. This
makes innovation through a project framework inherently challenging. This
article draws lessons from a project that fostered post-harvest innovations
in Uganda. First, a two-stage design allowed scoping out business cases
with partners to identify potential innovations. Second, stakeholders used
the Participatory Market Chain Approach (PMCA) to flexibly develop the
innovations. Third, flexible funding made it possible to seize new
opportunities along the way. Fourth, the project was attentive to surprises
in implementation and encouraged reflection.
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Over the past three decades, agricultural research has made a commendable paradigm shift towards
being more participatory and less rigid, but many projects are still designed and implemented with
little flexibility or adaptive management. The new paradigm emerged as a critique of the classical
top-down linear approach in which scientists created technology for extensionists to transfer to
farmers. The top-down approach had limited success in the complex, high-risk, heterogenous environ-
ments where most smallholders work and in which demand for technologies is embedded in local
knowledge of constraints and opportunities (Ashby 2009; Biggs 2008). Bottom-up participatory
approaches started emerging to make research more responsive to distinct, complex environments
and farmer demands (Scoones and Thompson 2009). However, the stakeholder focus has often been
narrow, mainly involving farmers only (Cleaver 2001; Francis 2001). Yet there are other stakeholders com-
mitted to and with interests in rural development, including NGOs, the private sector, and government
agencies. Over the last 30 years a distinct field of social science scholarship and practice has sought to
rethink the idea of agricultural research supply and demand in systemic terms of multiple actors and
sources of knowledge. Early work involved “Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems” (Röling
1990), and “Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems” or RAAKS (Engel and Salomon 1997).
Beginning around 2000 this work was consolidated in what became known as “Agricultural Innovation
Systems” (World Bank 2012). Innovation systems thinking shifts the focus from research per se – the pro-
duction of new knowledge, which might or might not be put into use – to innovation – the processes of
change in the production and marketing of goods and services, which might or might not be driven by
research (World Bank 2012). The developmental change occurs through the interactions between mul-
tiple actors – both individual and institutional – who have access to different knowledge and expertise
(Biggs 2008; Engel and Salomon 1997; World Bank 2006).
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Jeffery W. Bentley jefferywbentley@hotmail.com
DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE
https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2020.1832047
For innovation to occur, interactions among these diverse stakeholders need to be open and to
draw upon available knowledge. Aside from a strong capacity in research and development (R&D),
the ability to innovate is related to collective action, coordination, the exchange of knowledge
among diverse actors, the incentives and resources available to form partnerships and develop
businesses, and conditions that make it possible for farmers or entrepreneurs to use the innovations
(World Bank 2012). For example, in Laos, dry direct seeding (DDS) of rice depended on researchers to
develop the concept of machine seeding with fertiliser, machine shop owners to provide the new
planting equipment, and innovative farmers (with some investment capacity) to test and adapt
the innovations, which other farmers soon adopted (Clarke et al. 2018). Case studies from Nepal
and India suggest that agricultural innovation depends as much on institutional innovations (“learn-
ing competence”) as on technical change. For example, policy changes in Nepal allowed greater par-
ticipation from farmers and other non-state actors in rice breeding. In Andhra Pradesh, India, mango
exports were facilitated by creating links between farmer cooperatives and public-sector agencies
that could help to meet stringent pest control standards for entering the US market (Pant 2014).
However, asymmetries among partners with respect to power, knowledge, resources, institutional
strength, negotiation skills, and other assets may prevent a true partnership from developing (Raja-
lahti, Janssen, and Pehu 2008). An innovation culture requires trust, appreciation of other perspec-
tives, shared values and stable relationships capable of evolving to meet new challenges. Projects
that seek to collaborate on technical research with smallholders are further challenged because
the innovation generated can be an “endogenous shock” that itself adds uncertainty to the value
chain (Orr, Donovan, and Stoian 2018). These elements coupled with the need to proactively
involve a large number of stakeholders make projects aiming at fostering agricultural innovation
complex to manage, contributing to frequent failures (Ika 2012). One important reason for these fail-
ures is the tendency to manage these projects with a managerialist, technocratic, and instrumental
style (Ika and Hodgson 2014). This reflects a limited understanding of the difference between com-
plicated and complex problems (Katz 2016; Nason 2017).
Complicated problems can be hard to solve, but being reduceable to multiple, logically inter-
related bio-physical processes, they are addressable with rules and recipes (Nason 2017). For
example, sequencing the genome of sweetpotato is complicated, involving highly technical pro-
cedures, which however are all under the control of the researchers. On the other hand, complex
problems involve too many unknown and interrelated factors to be reduceable to an underlying
set of logical relations (Katz 2016).
Since agricultural innovation depends on the interaction of many self-organising actors operating
in their environment, instead of aiming to fully plan and control the process, interventions aiming at
stimulating innovation should be able to address complexity and foster the emergence of flexible
support instruments that enable adaptive management (Klerkx, Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010).
Many international development projects fail to deliver impact because “when facing a problem,
managers tend to automatically default to complicated thinking. Instead, they should be consciously
managing complexity” (Nason 2017). The World Bank Sourcebook on Agricultural Innovation
Systems (World Bank 2012) notes that agricultural innovation typically arises through dynamic inter-
action among the multiple actors involved in growing, processing, distributing and consuming agri-
cultural products. However, participatory approaches may be ineffective unless researchers’
attitudes and incentives are changed (World Bank 2006).
Even as managers of agricultural development projects have become aware of complexity in
planning, for example, shifting from logical frameworks (logframe) to actor-based theories of
change (Alvarez et al. 2010), project management still fails to take complexity fully on board. The
logframe and similar planning tools (e.g. impact pathway) are largely based on linear thinking
that, given certain assumptions, project activities lead to outputs, and hence to outcomes and
impact (Couillard, Garon, and Riznic 2009). By the 2010s, the logframe had been enriched by the
Theory (or Theories) of Change (ToC), a set of planning tools that call for continuous reflection
and learning during the project (Valters 2015). Many major donors such as DFID and USAID now
2 J. W. BENTLEY ET AL.
plan projects with theories of change – and similar tools – which look at the way outputs are trans-
lated into outcomes through the behavioural change of different actor groups, including changes in
knowledge, attitudes and practice, and therefore impacts.
However, in practice, international agricultural development still tries to innovate in a
project mode, with a defined timeframe, outputs and oversight procedures. As a result,
most projects are still designed to address complicated rather than complex problems, and
ToC may fall into the same traps as logframes, such as not taking into account local knowl-
edge and culture (Valters 2015) while discouraging any activities other than those defined at
the design stage, even as conditions change and actors refine their demands and reveal their
preferences and limitations. Often, failure happens because donors require their projects to
follow the same “one-size-fits-all” procedures, typically leading to top-down project manage-
ment, limited flexibility in management, and excessive focus on external accountability (Ika
2012).
In 2000, the International Potato Center (CIP) began experimenting with RAAKS, a participatory
approach to stimulate agricultural innovation that brings together stakeholders in a flexible, partici-
patory process (Devaux et al. 2009; Devaux et al. 2020; Engel and Salomon 1997). CIP first used
RAAKS to foster pro-poor market chain innovation for native potatoes in Peru. While this approach
proved useful for engaging value-chain actors, researchers, and service providers in the identification
of market opportunities, it did not include steps for exploiting the identified opportunities by devel-
oping new products or processes. As steps and tools were added for developing commercial inno-
vations, a new approach emerged, which became known as the Participatory Market Chain
Approach (PMCA), a structured – yet flexible – method for learning about a value chain, from
farmers, traders, processors, retailers and chefs, and stimulating commercial, technical and insti-
tutional innovations that benefit all actors in the chain (Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006;
Devaux et al. 2009).
In Peru, the application of PMCA engaged value chain actors leading to multiple commercial inno-
vations including blue, red or yellow chips made from native potato varieties and fresh, native pota-
toes packaged for supermarkets (Devaux et al. 2009). At least 20 more native potato products have
recently appeared on the market in Peru, showing how PMCA can trigger a sustainable innovation
process (Devaux et al. 2020).
The World Bank (World Bank 2012) notes that the application of PMCA in Peru has achieved
higher prices for native potatoes, increased farmers’ revenues, developed more stable markets for
producers (partly through successful branding and marketing), enhanced farmer’s self-esteem,
and facilitated inclusion of women in value chains. Relevant to this paper, the sourcebook also
points out that traditional evaluation approaches based on objectives and logical frameworks do
not work for this type of innovation processes. The processes and tasks involved are too complex
and results often take some time to be apparent.
The PMCA is based on three phases (Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006). In Phase 1, facilitators
from an R&D organisation lead a rapid assessment of farmers and other value chain actors, using
mapping, diagnostic and interview techniques (Horton et al. 2013). PMCA participants get to
know the value chain actors, and their circumstances, while identifying bottlenecks and market
opportunities. Value chain actors and stakeholders involved in PMCA form thematic groups
around innovations that address the identified opportunities and constraints (Bernet, Thiele, and
Zschocke 2006). In Phase 2, the thematic groups evaluate potential innovations, make a work
plan and hold an event to close the phase where they present ideas for exploiting the new
market opportunities, and receive feedback from new stakeholders. In Phase 3, the groups jointly
refine and launch the innovation, usually a new market product (e.g. a new brand of coffee), in a
final event. This phased approach is aligned to what Burns and Worsley (2015) proposed, that devel-
opment projects should start with a “participatory systems inquiry” (similar to Phase 1 of PMCA) to
allow participants to see and understand complexity and to identify leverage points within a system
where action can be taken. This should be followed by engagement approaches which entail a more
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structured approach of “systemic action research” (similar to Phase 2 of PMCA) or a more organic
process of “nurtured emergent development” (similar to Phase 3 of PMCA).
PMCA stimulates joint value chain innovations, based on shared ideas and trust, that translate
into enhanced smallholders’ participation that ensures they benefit directly.
How the PMCA is implemented will vary from case to case, as different contexts will require different activities
and tools to solve specific problems. In other words, the common denominator of PMCA is not so much ‘what’ is
being done but rather ‘how’ it is done. (Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006, 17)
The World Bank Sourcebook repeatedly cites PMCA as best practice and PMCA is highlighted with
an Innovation Activity Profile (World Bank 2012, 598).
In 2005, a group of Ugandan development specialists visited the Andes, with support from CIP, to
see the outcomes of the PMCA, which generated enthusiasm and confidence to apply the method
with Ugandan partners (Devaux et al. 2020). This stimulated several innovations with the private
sector including potato crisps, a sweetpotato variety and pickled hot peppers (Horton et al. 2010).
Some people who worked on this PMCA application would later support its use in the ENDURE
Project – the focus of this paper.
Study aims, project design and management structure
This paper asks: “How can an agricultural R&D project adapt to complexity and uncertainty over the
course of its three-year lifespan?” We describe the challenge of confronting complexity for inno-
vation within a project structure that requires formal planning during the initial design. The paper
aims to illustrate and discuss how complexity and uncertainty inherent in agricultural innovation
can be addressed in project design, management and learning by using a combination of
methods which included a participatory R&D approach (the PMCA), flexible project design and
funding, and the ability to adapt to unforeseen events such as by dropping some of the original
research topics, and modifying or adding others. It presents the experience of ENDURE (Expanding
Utilization of RTB and Reducing Their Post-harvest Losses), a project that combined elements of the
PMCA with flexibility in project design, budget, and in the management style that was attentive to
change and adapted to it. ENDURE aimed to reduce post-harvest losses through innovation in post-
harvest management in potato, sweetpotato, cassava and banana to improve food security and
increase income for smallholders, especially women, in Uganda.
This study is a retrospective analysis, by project insiders, including managers and designers, who
attempted to open the project management “black box” and learn how projects actually deal with
the challenge of complexity and uncertainty (see Ika 2015). This paper presents the experience of a
research project that fostered post-harvest innovations in agri-food value chains in Uganda to
provide a rich description of the project, looking at actual practice and roles and responsibilities.
Our analysis draws on innovation science and project management literature (Couillard, Garon,
and Riznic 2009; Ika 2012; Ika and Hodgson 2014; Klerkx et al. 2012). For example, we analyse
ENDURE as a classic example of complexity (e.g. Katz 2016; Nason 2017), which demanded constant
adaptation of the project plans and structure.
ENDURE was richly documented during its three-year life (2014-2017). This paper is based on a
review of that literature, including a business case (one each for potatoes, sweetpotatoes, cassava
and bananas), a case study of a female banana trader, a report of the PMCA inception workshop
for the banana sub-project, and a report on the PMCA final event for that same project, as well as
a stakeholder workshop in 2017. We also looked at the completion report, the final technical
report for each sub-project, and an external review sponsored by the project donors. The project
was also highlighted in the 2015 and 2016 annual reports of the CGIAR Research Program on
Roots, Tubers and Bananas (RTB).
The project was led by CIP and implemented in collaboration with the other
international research organisations which form part of RTB, along with local partners, including
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Uganda’s National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO), universities, NGOs and private-sector
actors.
ENDURE was planned with a flexible logframe developed during a planning workshop with sta-
keholders in 2012 (Table 1). The logframe left open the specific innovations that would be supported.
In Year 1 (2014), multi-organisation teams were established, each focusing on one of the four target
crops. The teams received funding to jointly conduct scoping studies (US$25,000 each) and write
business cases for different potential innovations building on their findings and framing their own
R&D agenda. The approach was competitive; after rigorous internal and external reviews, four of
the seven submitted cases for innovations were selected for implementation as sub-projects,
each implemented by its own team (“team” is defined as a loose group of partners from various
organisations, who collaborated on a specific sub-project). Table 2 shows the team members and
their main roles.
Selected project participants were trained to use the PMCAmethod. ENDURE was designed in two
stages, meant to coincide with the three phases of the PMCA. The project’s start-up stage dovetailed
with Phase 1 of PMCA. A flexible project design allowed the project to progressively zoom in on the
post-harvest and value chain innovations that were the most likely to succeed. Specific activities and
outputs contributing to the project’s overall goal were identified during the start-up stage in the first
year and the most promising innovations were tested and disseminated in the implementation stage
during following two years (corresponding to PMCA Phase 2 and Phase 3). The business case –which
is not part of the conventional PMCA application – was one of the key elements of project flexibility;
it entailed developing their R&D ideas. Preparing the business case for innovations provided oppor-
tunities for identifying and engaging with additional stakeholders to implement the R&D agenda.
The scoping studies and writing the business cases were a key part of the flexible project structure;
partners used this first stage to build collaborative skills and to learn how to work together while,
upon their review, the project management could identify less promising research lines not to be
further pursued.
Sub-project teams were each allocated part of the budget according to the products and the
research agenda that had been identified in Year 1 and presented in the business case (sub-
project teams received a similar level of funding, about US$350,000 each). Project management
retained part of the budget to support cross-cutting activities to ensure consistency (e.g. comparing
post-harvest losses of the four target crops) and relevance (e.g. analysing and addressing gender
dynamics within households and value chains) and for annual project review meetings and other
events where members of all teams shared ideas and lessons learnt. These activities enhanced cohe-
sion and cross-learning across teams and helped the teams to switch from the initial competitive
approach to a more collaborative one. Most importantly, these funds provided additional flexibility
by allowing the project management to seize new opportunities not identified during the start-up
stage (e.g. to facilitate linkages with additional private sector players, to access market price infor-
mation, reinforce potato storage facilities, provide fellowships to MSc students and strengthen
their research capacities). Sub-project teams, in consultation with project management, could also
reallocate funds to new activities when they were appropriate responses to emerging findings
and changing circumstances.
Results
Intervention as originally planned
During the first year, while writing the business cases, each crop team identified key innovations to
reduce post-harvest losses and improve post-harvest management, and conducted preliminary
market research on these options. During scoping, the different partners got to know each other,
their capacities, interests, strengths and weaknesses and how these would have complemented
one another. It also helped to identify and bring on board new partners and to drop others (who
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Table 1. The project’s logframe (summarised).
Verifiable indicators Means of verification Assumptions
Goal: contribute to improved food
security for RTB-producing
communities in Eastern and
Central Africa












Objectives: to improve food
availability and income generation
through better postharvest




Value chain assessment and
development
Capacity development
Decrease RTB storage losses
by 15% in pilot sites
20% increased storage life of
fresh RTB in pilot sites
10% increased processing of
RTB in pilot sites
10% increased income from
RTB and products, including
livestock, in pilot sites
More equitable distribution








RTB not undermined by
subsidies to grains
Outputs
1.1. RTB food availability situation
assessed and priorities for
improvement identified with value
chain actors
4 crop and marketing
assessments completed
Project reports
1.2. RTB PHL reduction technologies
inventoried and gaps for research
identified




1.3. RTB varieties with improved
postharvest characteristics validated
with target communities







1.4. RTB on-farm storage and
processing systems trialled and
validated





1.5. Other RTB technologies to reduce
PHL and expand utilisation validated




2.1. Current RTB value chains and food
access situation assessed and
priorities for improvement and
enhanced gender equity identified
with value chain actors
Priorities for improvement
shared and agreed with







2.2. Assess new market opportunities
to use RTB with stakeholders
1 new market opportunity
identified per RTB crop
Project reports
2.3. RTB producer/processor groups
strengthened
2 producer/processor groups




platforms for RTB value chain
innovation created
4 platforms created and












No. of website hits








3.2. Capacity built in national partners
for reducing PHL and increasing use
of RTB









developed so partners can












Activities (sample of selected activities)
(Continued )
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Table 1. Continued.
Verifiable indicators Means of verification Assumptions
Training of RTB producer and
processor groups in innovation and
market analysis
15 producer and processor
groups trained
Participant scores in end
of training test
Organise stakeholder meetings for
innovation in postharvest and value
added
5 stakeholder meetings held
per year in 3 stakeholder
platforms
Minutes of meetings
Set up online documentation platform 150 inventory items online Website
Organise training in PHL technologies
and on assessing PHL at national
level
3 national training activities in
PHL conducted
Workshop reports
Documenting project activities 1 synthesis document each
year
Project reports
Notes: acronyms are M&E (monitoring and evaluation); PHL (post-harvest losses); RTB (root, tuber and banana crops).
Table 2. Sub-projects’ team members and their main role in the innovation process.
Sub-project Action research Capacity building and outreach Private sector
Potato
(led by CIP)
. CIP (varietal evaluation and
storage systems)
. NARO (agricultural practices,
harvesting techniques)
. Makerere University (market
assessments, varietal
evaluation, storage evaluation)
. NARO (pre- and post-harvest
management)
. NGO Self-Help Africa (store
management, entrepreneurial skills,
business plans)
. 3 farmers’ associations
. A traders’ association
Sweetpotato
(led by CIP)
. CIP (varietal evaluation)
. ILRI (assessment feeding
practices, feed evaluation)
. NARO (bio-chemical analyses,
feeding trials)
. Makerere University (market
assessment, bio-chemical
analyses)
. Uganda Martyrs University
(varietal evaluation and
agronomic practices)
. NARO (silage making and use)
. NGO CHAIN Uganda (silage making and
use, silage business centres,
entrepreneurial skills, business plans)
. NGO VEDCO (silage making and use,
silage business centres, entrepreneurial
skills, business plans)
. Iowa State University – Uganda
Programme (silage making and use)






. IITA (market assessment,
business support)
. NARO (varietal evaluation, bio-
chemical analyses postharvest
assessment)




. Kyambogo University (post-
harvest evaluation)
. IITA (market linkages)
. CIAT (methods for postharvest
assessment)
. NARO (pre- and post-harvest
management)
. NGO IIRR (entrepreneurial skills,
business plans)
. Brica Investments Ltd





. Bioversity Int. (market
assessment, seed system)
. NARO (postharvest and
storage evaluation)
. CIRAD (optimum harvest time)
. Makerere University (optimum
harvest time)
. Bioversity Int. (seed system,
postharvest management, market
linkage, business plans)
. Local Government Units (seed system)





. Ssemwanga Centre for
Agriculture and Food
Ltd
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developed frictions with other partners). This probably avoided more serious problems within the
team and made it easier to plan and identify responsibilities and workplans for each business
case. At the end of Year 1, 60 people held a three-day meeting to launch the main project stage:
the implementation of the selected business cases for innovation with their partners, thus
defining the R&D agenda, summarised below for each sub-project (Table 3).
Potato. This crop is harvested twice a year in Uganda. Smallholders who sell their tubers to traders
may receive low prices because of seasonal gluts of potatoes on the market. Being able to store pota-
toes for even a few weeks would allow farmers to earn higher prices. In its business case, the team
proposed helping farmers store their potatoes on-farm until prices rebounded by improving storage
facilities, mainly by using ideas from neighbouring Kenya. These included: small household-sized
storage sheds, larger collective stores, and “coolbot” stores fitted with air conditioning run by
solar power.
Sweetpotato. This root crop is more important in Uganda than in any other African country. Pig
rearing is increasingly popular. Many smallholders who raise swine also grow sweetpotatoes, and
feed the fresh leaves, vines and unmarketable roots to their pigs. But sweetpotato is a perishable,
seasonal crop. Women livestock owners spend up to four hours a day acquiring food for their
pigs, and if farmers had a way to preserve sweetpotato waste, women would save time and
money. The sweetpotato team proposed to work on silage: chopped sweetpotato leaves, vines
and roots, stored in an airtight container that could be kept for several months.
Cassava. The quality of cassava roots starts to deteriorate immediately after harvesting, with a
shelf-life of two to three days. Rural households respond to this by gradually harvesting a field
over several weeks, or by processing the roots soon after harvesting: by chipping and drying.
Traders adapt to the short self-life by transporting fresh roots to market and selling them quickly.
Nevertheless, much fresh cassava spoils along the chain or has to be sold off before going bad. In
order to extend the shelf-life of cassava roots and building on experiences in Latin America, one pro-
posal was to apply a food-grade fungicide and keep the harvested roots in plastic bags, ensuring
high relative humidity. Another idea was to clean, wash and dry the roots, and dip them in hot,
liquid paraffin which forms a protective coat (waxing) that keeps the roots fresh for weeks.
Banana. Cooking banana (shortened to “banana” here) is the main staple crop in Uganda. Most
farmers have a banana garden to feed their families, selling the excess. However, the banana
scoping study found that farmers were not always growing the varieties that the market demanded,
especially those with a longer “green life”. The project proposed macro-propagation (a village-level
method for producing several viable suckers of market-preferred varieties from one plant), storage
technologies and enhanced linkages with other value chain actors.
As agreed with the donors, the project logframe was not written in stone, but was updated to
reflect the results of the scoping studies and business cases. A detailed workplan described the
Table 3. Main innovations originally proposed by ENDURE, by sub-project.
Sub-project Original ideas identified in the first year
Potato Test different varieties for storability.
Design and test storage facilities where farmers could keep, either individually or collectively, tubers for a few
weeks.
Sweetpotato Silage: sweetpotato vines and unmarketable roots chopped and stored to feed pigs.
Test different dual-purpose varieties for food (root) and feed (canopy).
Business models for reaching pig farmers with silage.
Cassava Test different varieties for postharvest physiological deterioration (PPD) and pruning to slow its progression after
harvest.
Plastic bags to keep high relative humidity (i.e. keep cassava moist).
Dipping of roots in wax to slow PPD down.
Banana Establish macro-propagation chambers at farmer level.
Temperature-regulated storage options for different presentation forms of bananas (bunches, clusters, peeled
and unpeeled fingers).
Sale of sorted and graded bananas by weight and cushioning to minimise bruises during transportation.
8 J. W. BENTLEY ET AL.
revised activities and the outcomes the teams expected to achieve. Planned activities included build-
ing potato stores and setting up varietal trials, pig feeding trials and analysing nutritional profiles of
different blends of sweetpotato silage, testing relative humidity bags and cassava waxing, and estab-
lishing mother gardens and macro-propagation chambers for bananas, as well as trainings, studies
and other activities. Figure 1 shows project locations and on-station research sites. An action plan
was developed to ensure that gender was systematically mainstreamed in the project (e.g.
opening more space for women leaders in the management of potato stores) and to build team
members’ capacities.
Challenges and difficulties
Phase 2 of PMCA started in 2015, and although various difficulties emerged, teams were able to col-
laborate to adapt to the circumstances and modify activities, accordingly.
Potato. The first season of field and storage trials did not go as planned with several setbacks,
including drought, unavailability of hay bales of similar consistency for building the large potato
stores, and rodent attacks. The “coolbot” idea (air-conditioned storage) was dropped because the
insulation material was too expensive and due to the unforeseen high risk of theft of the solar
panels. Furthermore, the potato crop was affected by bacterial wilt (a disease that causes both
field and storage losses). Even so, researchers tested eight CIP potato clones and 10 local potato var-
ieties on-station. With farmer associations, the team built four collective stores, and designed the
individual ones, while training 119 farmers to manage them. Collective potato stores were launched
at a two-day event in October 2015.
Sweetpotato. The university lab was late providing the nutrition profile of the different types of
silage, which delayed identifying the most suitable ones, setting back the on-station and on-farm
pig feeding trials. Meanwhile, the piglets kept growing until they were no longer suitable for the
original experimental design, but the team was able to adapt, by conducting the trials with pigs
of different ages. Researchers started on-station trials of dual-purpose sweetpotato varieties (that
could be used for silage and as people food) but a drought destroyed the first ones. Motorised chop-
pers (to cut vines and roots in small pieces suitable for feeding pigs) were not available on the market
and hammer mills had to be modified and used. Feeding trials were concluded with five treatments,
with different inclusion rate of maize bran and cassava flour. The project trained 277 farmers to make
and use silage.
Cassava. The proposed technologies, despite being commercially used in Latin America, were
completely new in the country. Some friction emerged between two Ugandan research partners
due to overlap of their national mandate. This was overcome by defining their roles more clearly:
assigning responsibilities for post-harvest evaluation to one organisation and biochemical analyses
to the other, with one MSc student assigned to each task. There was a lack of water for the cassava
pack house (shed where cassava can be waxed and packed for market) to be managed by farmers. In
spite of this, researchers collected 17 cassava varieties that were analysed for their biochemical prop-
erties and speed of post-harvest physiological deterioration (PPD). MSc students tested on-station
waxing, high relative humidity bags and pruning (removing leaves six to seven days before
harvest to extend shelf-life). In July 2015, six team members (mostly researchers) took a nine-day
learning visit to CIAT headquarters in Colombia to be trained on how to assess PPD and extend
the shelf life of cassava. Two pilot pack houses were established in project sites in Uganda.
Banana. Initial trials with two farmer groups for the sale of sorted and graded bananas by weight
and cushioning to minimise bruises during transportation found that local traders were reluctant to
pay more for graded and cushioned bananas, so this activity was largely dropped. Ten mother
gardens were established with about 1,500 tissue culture plantlets of four market-preferred varieties,
and four macro-propagation chambers were built jointly with local farmers organisations to further
multiply clean planting material of preferred varieties. Each mother garden supplied two to three
farmer groups. CIRAD started trials on optimal harvest time of banana bunches.
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Figure 1. Map of ENDURE research sites, by crop and partner.
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Adapting to surprise
Development planning should “plan on surprises”, but it should also plan on human inventiveness
(Scott 1998). Most project planning leaves little room for surprise. However, innovation processes
with farmers and other value chain actors form part of a complex system and therefore cannot be
tightly planned three years in advance (Ortiz et al. 2020).
Potato. One of the four large, collective stores collapsed under the weight of the cement plaster
on the hay bales and because of termite damage to the timber poles. The team rebuilt the store
based on an improved design and strengthened the others. It also developed guidelines for
farmers on how to manage potato stores (both technically and institutionally), and tested 18
potato varieties, identifying one that was suitable for storage and met the demand of consumers
and processors. Trials with farmers showed that potatoes could be stored for six weeks, and up to
nine weeks at higher altitudes. Twelve small, eight-ton stores were built so farmers could store pota-
toes at household level. Based on farmers’ feedback these small stores were larger than the individ-
ual stores originally proposed. Furthermore, based on emerging evidence of damage of potatoes at
harvesting being a major cause of post-harvest losses, the team decided to trial ridge-planting and
two types of potato lifter (mechanical harvester) on station (one ox-drawn and another attached to a
tractor). Both lifters worked well, but farmers preferred the ox-drawn lifter for its ease of use.
Sweetpotato. There were problems finding safe, affordable and practical mechanical choppers on
the local market. Trials found that silage produced in a plastic silo and mixed with maize bran was
drier (i.e. less prone to spoilage), and farmers made over 77 tons of silage. An MSc student identified
a dual-purpose variety which was suitable for both food and feed. The team reconfirmed the idea
that silage needs to be supplemented with commercial feed (particularly maize bran) to ensure sat-
isfactory growth rates of pigs. Three business centres were established to sell silage to pig farmers,
and to provide fee-based chopping services, trainings and materials, including planting material of
sweetpotato dual-purpose varieties, to farmers and entrepreneurs interested in making silage them-
selves. The team also came across and supported a youth group that made silage for sale to farmers.
Cassava. The farmer pack house had problems accessing water, but the one run by a trader had
started selling waxed cassava roots commercially. Researchers realised that they needed to add
sensory studies (taste tests) of the waxed roots that had been stored for 14 days. Waxed cassava
was market tested in dozens of different outlets, including supermarkets. There was limited interest
in the high relative humidity technology (the plastic bag) and it was dropped.
Banana. Mother gardens and macro-propagation chambers were fully operational and local gov-
ernment was further disseminating the technology. Two communities were starting to sell planting
material as a business. Optimal harvest times for cooking banana were established. Two women
began to sell bananas wholesale, including one who also exported. Optimum storage temperatures
for bananas were established. The project began to promote an evaporation charcoal cooler (a
cabinet with wire-mesh walls filled with charcoal) for peeled bananas in fresh produce markets in
the capital city Kampala.
PMCA is a method that provides ample space for adaptation to emerging findings. While imple-
menting the project, researchers were surprised with some of the innovations. For instance, there
was low adoption of storing cassava in plastic bags, and the silage was too wet, contributing to
early spoilage of the feed. The coolbot idea was impractical and was dropped. The sweetpotato
trials had to be delayed because of the difficulties of coordinating the many actors. For bananas,
the idea of selling fruit by weight was dropped because traders were reluctant to use it. Some of
the surprises were about safety of the innovation, which no one had anticipated as a possible
problem: women willing to make silage were concerned that motorised choppers could cause inju-
ries, and the potato stores’ structures were so heavy that one collapsed. Spotting such problems is a
strength of participatory research, but responding to them requires flexible project management, as
well as adaptable decision-making among partners who share a common goal. In other words,
several ideas originally proposed were still too researcher-centric and had to be winnowed out.
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This was possible because of the built-in flexibility of the PMCA that does not consider a discarded
line of research as a failure. Other research ideas, such as forming small farmer groups to produce
banana planting material, or making silage for pigs, were adapted and the prospered.
Table 4 shows some of the creative responses to the surprises. Some of the required changes
were institutional, such as adding a youth group to the sweetpotato team, or supporting the existing
banana multi-stakeholder platform. Others were technical, such as adding evaluations of potato
lifters and modifying the chopper design to make silage production safer. Some activities were
dropped, such as the cushioning for bananas, while others were added, such as the charcoal
coolers to keep bananas cool at the retail market.
Flexibilitywasbuilt intoENDURE’s two-stagedesignand supportedbyprojectmanagement, budget-
ing and donors. PMCA’s flexible nature made it an appropriate tool for encouraging teams to assume
ownership, to influence outcomes, and to engage with other actors. For example, the banana team
Table 4. Project responses to surprise.
Sub-project Surprise / unplanned event Response
Potato 1. Harvesting with hoes damaged the tubers: the
major cause of losses
1. A: In the third year, the team began to study ox-
drawn and motorised potato lifters*
2. One out of the four large potato stores collapsed
due to poor design and termites (and it was too
expensive)
2. M: Store rebuilt with a new design to be safer (e.g.
sturdier, lighter) and also cheaper. Other stores
strengthened with metal beams*
3. There were no local suppliers of material required
for coolbot (store at controlled temperature) and the
solar panels were easily stolen
3. C: The coolbot component was dropped
Sweetpotato 1. The team loaned silage choppers to farmers. One
farmer took the chopper home; while making silage
her child was accidentally injured by the machine’s
belt. The lead farmer in Kamuli also lost a finger
while chopping silage for women farmers (who
feared using the chopper on their own)
1. M: The chopper design had to be modified, with a
cover over the belt, to make it safer*
2. The original silage design required a metal drum,
with a bag in the drum, and a perforated plastic pipe
in the bag to drain off moisture. The pipe and drum
were expensive. Climbing into the drums forced the
women to lift up their skirts, which they disapproved
2. M: The team replaced the originally planned
supplement (molasses) with maize bran to the
chopped sweetpotato to make a drier silage, without
the need for the metal drum and the plastic tube
3. Farmers were interested in silage, but found manual
chopping too labour-intensive and the choppers
were costly
3. M: The three original demo centres were restructured
as silage business centres to provide training, and
chopping services that farmers could access for a fee
4. The team came across a dynamic youth group that,
supported by a local researcher, had been involved
in making and selling silage for a few years, primarily
for cattle
4. A: the team was eventually supported by the project
with a silage chopper to help disseminate the
technology in an additional district*
Banana 1. The team envisioned cushions to protect banana
bunches on route to market, but traders were
unwilling to pay the added cost
1. C: Cushioning activity dropped
2. Original ideas for extending banana shelf-life in
markets were unsuitable
2. A: Charcoal cooler component added
3. A regional banana multi-stakeholder platform was
identified near project sites during the market study
3. M: The existing regional platform was supported,
rather than creating one from scratch
4. A women’s seed group was established, but they
found it difficult to sell banana plantlets
4. A: Participating in a trade fair created more demand
and gave the women access to a wider market
Cassava 1. Roots often suffered mechanical damage during
harvest, which accelerate spoilage
1. A: Farmers were trained to plant in ridges and to
harvest more carefully
2. Two enterprises (a trader and a farmer cooperative)
started to sell waxed roots. The trader stopped
waxing roots, but the farmer continued, with limited
volumes. Both enterprises had limited business
capacities
2. M: As waxed cassava was a high-end product; market
testing was primarily done in supermarkets. Training
was given to the management of both enterprises to
increases their business capacities
3. Limited initial interest of buyers in high relative
humidity plastic bags discouraged the pilot
enterprises from investing in them
3. C: Scaled down because of low adoption
Notes: A = Additional component; C = Cancelled or scaled-down component; M = Major modification of the component; * Totally
or partially supported by centrally managed funds.
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progressively built strong engagement with local governments. The group of women banana farmers
mentioned in Table 4 established their own commercial macro-propagation chamber and received a
grant of US$2,000 from the local government’s gender fund to expand their seed business. After the
project, the district government and a local NGO spread the macro-propagation technology to areas
within and outside of the district. Near the end of the project, the business centres established in two
districts by partner NGOs acquired funds to sell farmers silage choppers on credit and the youth
group, another partner, experimented with making silage into pellets.
Some of the least promising activities were dropped or scaled down, freeing staff and money to
implement others that had not been originally planned. Sometimes new partners were brought in
(such as the youth group to make and sell silage). In other instances, a project partner was dropped
due to limited engagement and unsatisfactory performances. Many of these adaptations would not
have been possible with the typical rigid project design and without the flexibility that was granted
to the project by the donor.
Case study: the banana sub-project
All four ENDURE teams used the PMCA, but the banana team followed the method most closely. In
February 2015 (Year 2), the banana team held a five-day workshop to train sub-project partners and
other stakeholders to use the PMCA. Following PMCA, the team established two thematic groups,
which are “groups with a shared interest” in the innovations to be developed. Group 1 focused
on marketing of differentiated forms of bananas (fingers, clusters, and peeled), protected
bunches, and on weight-based pricing. Group 2 focused on identifying market-demanded varieties,
introducing and multiplying their planting material, establishing demonstration sites, and facilitating
the sale of the plantlets.
The PMCA is designed to stimulate different types of innovation: technical, institutional, and com-
mercial (Devaux et al. 2009; Ortiz et al. 2020). The greatest technical innovation was the split corm
method (cutting the banana corm into sections) that was found the most suitable and cost-effective
technique for multiplying the planting material of the market-preferred varieties (identified during
the scoping study in Year 1). Other important technical innovations included the identification of
the optimal harvesting time (with good trade-off between ripening and shelf-life) and the introduc-
tion of the staggered removal of suckers.
In terms of institutional innovation, the team supported the farmers groups to develop two
business models for selling and distributing plantlets outside and within their communities, respect-
ively, in order to ensure a balance between economic viability and fair access to seed by other
farmers not involved in the project, thus avoiding their resentment. Moreover, following an analysis
of gender norms and roles in the value chain and intra-household dynamics, specific responsibilities
were identified through a facilitated process to ensure that both men and women benefitted from
the initiative. For instance, women were mainly in charge of the management of the macro-propa-
gation chambers and of distribution within the community, while men provided primarily support-
ing roles, offering labour for construction work, and utilising their knowledge, experiences and
networks to facilitate the sale of plantlets outside their village. While ENDURE was intended to estab-
lish multi-stakeholder innovation platforms for each target crop, the team learnt that a banana plat-
form already functioned (Western Region Banana Platform) and decided to strengthen it rather than
building a new one. New partners were brought on board: the Uganda Fruits and Vegetable Expor-
ters and Producers Association (UFVEPA) – key for accessing export market and enhancing compli-
ance to quality standards – and two district governments which would prove crucial for scaling the
macro-propagation technique to non-target villages. However, one private actor underperformed,
and some of its responsibilities and budget were reduced and transferred to NARO.
As for commercial innovation, Thematic Group 2 identified seed as a business opportunity for
women. Men and women farmers started selling quality planting material of market-preferred var-
ieties with improved packaging and labelling and were linked with the Western Region Banana
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Platform to find customers beyond their community, including traders, input dealers and other
farmers. One of these groups, Bakyala Kwekulakulanya (Women in Development) used members’
resources to build an additional large multiplication chamber, and at the PMCA’s final event, the
group was awarded a grant by the district to build a water tank. ENDURE formally ended in early
2017, but by the end of the year this group had sold US$3,000 worth of plantlets and began to
offer training to other farmers.
Discussion and conclusions
Promoting innovation in agricultural value chains is inherently complex. Innovations unfold in uncer-
tain ways, so they cannot be entirely planned or predicted in advance. It is advisable to first facilitate
joint understanding of the problem by many stakeholders and then together generate ideas, proto-
types and interventions that include mechanisms to learn and adapt from feedback arising from
engagement with the problem. This paper discussed how complexity and uncertainty have been
addressed in the design, management and learning of a specific project, ENDURE.
ENDURE was designed around a participatory approach for fostering innovation in value chains,
the PMCA, which recognises that innovation cannot be fully anticipated, especially when the pro-
ject’s innovations cause changes in a system that is constantly evolving (Orr, Donovan, and Stoian
2018). Accordingly, PMCA starts with a diagnostic phase to identify a potential core innovation
and the actors to engage in a facilitated innovation process. In order to enhance the fit between
PMCA and a quite large – although still resource-limited – R&D project like ENDURE, the project
was designed with a two-stage approach and funding which could allocate funds to sub-projects
as opportunities emerged, allowing for the flexibility to accommodate innovation. The start-up
stage entailed scoping studies, the development of seven business cases, of which four were
selected for funding. This first stage identified (and in some cases revised) the core innovations
most likely to succeed while improving the theory of change and partnerships before starting full
implementation. In the second stage, implementation, more rigorous assessments were conducted
and those innovations that had proven technically feasible, economically viable and socially accep-
table were promoted and disseminated.
The project management was attentive to surprises: unexpected or unplanned changes or
events, linked to the complexity of innovation processes. In consultation with project management,
each implementation team could add, drop or change activities. Well into the project’s life, imple-
menting teams could still reallocate funds from disappointing activities to more successful ones.
Project management could provide additional funds to teams to support promising activities that
had not been anticipated at time of developing the business cases.
Feedback and cross-learning were systematically promoted by ENDURE. Surprise was fed back
creatively into project management. The project encouraged an approach from the beginning
that surprise was not failure. For instance, if a potato store collapses, while it is disappointing and
dangerous, it is also a learning experience and can lead to jointly designing a new improved
store based on users’ feedback. After selecting the business cases, ENDURE switched from a competi-
tive to a more collaborative approach among implementing teams. Reflection meetings were held
with all partners to compare results and experiences across teams. This helped teams to identify
areas that had to be added, strengthened, scaled down or dropped based on emerging findings.
ENDURE recognised that innovation is complexandprojectmanagementneeds tohave theflexibility
to adapt. Project management systematically tried to avoid rigid planning and some of themost prom-
ising innovations emerged unplanned, toward the end of the project, for example, making pellets from
sweetpotato silage and linking banana seed producers to local governments. The lessons learnt should
be valuable for other development projects which support innovation in complex systems. The three-
year project lifecycle was too short to fully validate the proposed innovations or to take them to
scale. Hence, an additional recommendation for donors is to sequence investments across a portfolio
through phased projects for nurturing promising innovations to full potential.
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